Introduction

Terrorism, in its broadest sense, occurs when terror is used as a political and psychological weapon. Those who advocate terror or terrorism justify it as a necessary evil in defense of a greater good. They define terror as a reactive policy to the dangers posed by internal and/or external enemies. This is true both for terror by the state (state terror) or by non-state actors (terrorism from below, or terrorists).

Terror is explicit and violent coercion, real or threatened. Terror is therefore a reactive, defensive, and necessary response to the Other's initial terror. This remains the case whether or not the Other's terror is real or perceived. The use of terror is justified in either secular or religious law. Once unleashed, terror enters into an action-reaction endless loop of violence, a cycle of violence that is very difficult to escape from. The violence escalates, and as it does, it becomes more indiscriminate and leads to atrocities against civilians. These atrocities generate further atrocities, which recruit new combatants, until the violence becomes self-sustaining and self-annihilating. Once this fire of violence is raging, it becomes nearly impossible to know who or what sparked it. If, as Margaret Thatcher has said, "Publicity is the oxygen of terrorism," it is useful to look for the smoldering resentment, frustration, and stagnation that tend to underlie all such outbreaks. While the state has a technological advantage in terms of coercion, surveillance, and control, terrorism's great asset is its unpredictability. In circumstances of terror, Newton's third law of motion is altered: every action has an opposite and *unequal* reaction. The sides are unequal; therefore the reaction will be unequal too.

Terror has always been a weapon of war. It is brutal and effective in subduing enemies and dissuading them from further resistance. Terror is essential to all tyrannies and despotisms to maintain subjugation and squash resistance. It was often employed in religious wars as a means of conversion or even sacrifice. These uses of terror are beyond the scope of this study. This is the study of terrorism, a word that is politically loaded. It

has currently over a hundred definitions[1] within the field of
Terrorism Studies. Experts and researchers create the majority of
the definitions of terrorism in think tanks; their definitions tend
to reflect the legalistic needs and jurisdiction of the government
agencies that sponsor them. Hence, the FBI, State Department,
and the CIA each have their own definitions of terrorism that
reflect their legal mandates. A minority of these definitions are
created by reactionary academics[2], who try to illuminate
Western state-sponsored and state terrorism. There are a few
misguided academics that try to incorporate both of these
definitions, resulting in a definition so broad that it is effectively
useless.[3] Rather than fall into this trap of defining *terrorism*, it is
more useful is to study how terror becomes an *ism*,[4] to locate the
point when terror becomes a policy, a doctrine, and obtains its
distinctive character.

This book examines terrorism from its beginning with the
"reign of terror" under Robespierre during the French
Revolution to its role in September 11 and the subsequent wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rather than examine acts of terrorism
and terrorist groups, it explores the intellectual history of
terrorism. It examines in detail the relationship between
terrorism and revolution, how terror was first used as a
deliberate and rational policy to bolster the French Revolution in
a time of crisis and its subsequent use as a form of propaganda to
kick-start a new revolution. Both terrorism and revolution have
evolved dramatically over the decades. Tactics, technology, and
conditions change and successful strategies quickly become

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[1] For the latest on this continuing and misdirected debate on the definition of
"terrorism" see Walter Laqueur, *No end to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First
Century* (New York and London: Continuum, 2003), 236.
[2] Reactionary in the sense that they are reacting to the manufacture of the
"terrorism industry." See Edward S. Herman and Gerry O'Sullivan, *The
"Terrorism" Industry: The Experts and Institutions That Shape Our View of
Terror* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989).
[3] Gayle Olson-Raymer, *Terrorism: A Historical and Contemporary Perspective*
(New York: American Heritage Custom Publishing, 1996), 6.
[4] The Oxford English Dictionary Second Edition (1989) defines "ism, quasi-n."
as "A form of doctrine, theory, or practice having, or claiming to have, a
distinctive character or relation: chiefly used disparagingly, and sometimes with
implied reference to schism."

disseminated to other revolutionaries and terrorists groups. It is therefore necessary to examine the relationship between terrorism and revolution and their mutual evolution to be able to comprehend twenty-first century terrorism. In this thesis we will examine three revolutionary periods in detail: the French Revolution; the Cuban revolution and the subsequent failed revolutions of 1968; and the Iranian revolution.

Chapter one begins with the reign of terror. It is the first time that terror was used as a deliberate and rational policy by the state to bolster the revolution in a time of crisis. The French Revolution used propaganda to inspire revolutionaries in countries throughout Europe and became the model for revolutions. The subsequent revolutions in France in 1830 and 1848 inspired a wave of revolutions that swept Europe. Revolutionary theorists studied these revolutions and came to that conclusion that when certain underlying conditions prevailed, revolutions could occur. Marxist thought went further, stating that revolutions were dialectical and could only occur when revolutionary conditions were met. They cautioned revolutionaries to wait for the right moment and to educate and organize the people with revolutionary propaganda.

In the 1850s Italian revolutionary Carlo Pisacane espoused the idea that written revolutionary propaganda could be supplemented by "propaganda of the deed"—exemplary acts of violence against symbolic targets —to create publicity for the revolution. While this idea proved to be very popular amongst revolutionaries and anarchists and quickly spread thorough Europe and North America, it failed to bring about any revolution and was in fact extremely detrimental to the revolutionaries' cause. The public was terrified and confused by these acts of violence and sought increased protection from the state. The state with increased police powers infiltrated and imprisoned revolutionary and anarchist groups. For these reasons propaganda of the deed fell out of favor with Marxist revolutionaries and was condemned as anti-revolutionary.

While terrorist acts and other examples of the propaganda of the deed occurred at relative intervals in the first half of the twentieth century, it wasn't until decolonization after WWII that a systematic campaign of terrorism was designed to get the

attention of the international press, starting with the Irgun in British-mandated Palestine but more notably with the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) in Algeria in 1956. The FLN had tried to follow a more orthodox campaign of rural guerilla warfare along the lines outlined by Mao, but the Algerian countryside proved to be inhospitable for such a campaign. In desperation, they waged an urban terrorist campaign in Algiers designed to grab the attention of the American and International press. They bombed soft, civilian targets and waged a campaign of terror and violence. In the ensuing Battle of Algiers the French government sent in paratroopers to find and destroy the FLN, but their indiscriminate use of violence and torture against the Arab majority help them win the battle but cost them the war.

Out of his experiences as a medic with the FLN during the Algerian war, Frantz Fanon devised a theory of the cleansing nature of violence as a necessary part of decolonization. He believed that the national cause could transfer the frustration and anger of the colonized to the colonizer. This idea proved popular within decolonization movements and the FLN mixture of the terrorism and guerilla warfare was a model for both the ANC (African National Congress) and the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization). Terrorism was not the first choice for these organizations but they resorted to it when they felt there was no other alternative.

Chapter two examines the intellectual history behind the "sudden" outbreak of modern international terrorism in the summer of 1968. Terrorism studies often cite the series of highly published international hijackings of airplanes by Palestinian terrorist factions as the start of modern international terrorism. Yet I would argue that by examining only the actual incidents of terrorism cannot understand the underlying intellectual history of terrorism and its deeper relation to revolutionary thought and practice.

Indeed, 1968 was an extraordinarily revolutionary year. In the United States, Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy were assassinated. In the Vietnam War, the Tet offensive had polarized American society and was the divisive issue of that election year. In France, students had occupied the universities,

erected barricades, and rioted in the streets, they joined with the workers and create a widespread general strike. Mao's cultural revolution was sweeping through China. In Czechoslovakia the Prague spring was been watched carefully by the Soviet Union. In this extraordinary revolutionary atmosphere, then, the outbreak of international terrorism is not so sudden as some scholars claim. More importantly, there was also a new and popular ideological framework for these groups that grew out of the experience of the Cuban Revolution. Che Guevara and French intellectual Regis Debray developed the idea of the *foco*—a small group of revolutionaries who were the main engine of the revolution. This radically diverted from the orthodox Marxist viewpoint that believed in a painstaking organizing and educating the people around the party while preparing to seize the revolutionary moment when it finally appeared. The idea of the *foco* remained popular despite the capture and execution of Che in the jungles of Bolivia, in 1967. Supporters believed that the problem was the scene of the battleground not the theory, that guerilla warfare should be waged in urban rather than rural areas. The international terrorism outbreak occurred in the summer of '68 because the revolutionary moment started to slip away. When the revolution did not occur, for the dedicated few terrorism was seen as a means to restart the revolution: its main attraction was its immediacy—action not discussion. To quote the Bader Meinhof gang's motto, "Don't Argue, Destroy."

Chapter three examines in detail the ideas of Guy Debord's *spectacle* and Baudrillard's *simulacra* and their relationship to the events of the May '68 revolution in France. Debord's 1967 book the *Society of the Spectacle* was highly influential, his supporters the Situationalists were one of the core groups involved in the May '68. The core thesis of the *Society of the Spectacle* is that society has been transformed from a society of ideas to a society of images. Image and reality are no longer inseparable and coexist as the spectacle. While Debord is able to describe the spectacle in vivid detail, he is unable to find away to defeat it. The revolution was assimilated by the spectacle in the form of media images that distorted the reality of the revolution. Jean Baudrillard was personally involved in the events of May

'68 and saw firsthand the distortion of the revolution in the media. This was the initial spark for his development of his idea of the simulacra which can be seen as a development of Debord's spectacle. More importantly is the post revolution interaction between the spectacle and terrorism. Another Situationalist, Gianfranco Sanguinetti, examined the role of terrorism in Italy in the 1970s and 1980s. Terrorism became the perfect spectral enemy for the spectacle; its threat to society is greatly amplified to increase the power of the State. Debord's 1990 follow up. *Comments on the Society of the Spectacle*, calls terrorism the perfect foe of the spectacle because compared with terrorism, everything else must be acceptable. Baudrillard stated that terrorist events become so easily orchestrated and decoded by the media that they seem to be preprogrammed events.

Chapter four examines the significant turning point in terrorism from propaganda of the deed to propaganda of the dead. In the 1970s, a leading terrorist researcher described terrorism as theater— "terrorist want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead."[5] Terrorists carefully choreographed violence to achieve maximum publicity. But in the 1980s a new form of terrorism emerged—suicidal terrorism. Two distinct forms of suicidal terrorism emerged: the Irish Republican hunger strikers in Northern Ireland, and the suicide bombers in Lebanon. What these two had in common was the explicit willingness of the terrorists to kill themselves, to add their own deaths to the terrorist act. Both were influenced by the Iranian revolution, the hunger strikers by the Iranian hostage crisis, and the suicide bombers by the Iranian child martyrs in the Iran-Iraq war. The Irish Republican prisoners used the hunger strike— ostensibly a non-violent tactic—with a new terroristic logic. They held their own bodies hostage and starved to death in full glare of the world's media. The hunger strike was the culmination of a five-year struggle of the between the Irish Republican prisoners and the British government to regain their status as political prisoners. It was only as an afterthought that the Irish Republicans also nominated the Hunger Strikers to run

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[5] Brian Michael Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?" *Rand Report P-5541* (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1975), 4, http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P5541/

for seats in the British parliament and the Irish Dáil. The Hunger Strike generated huge publicity and outcry from the world. The media daily counted the days that the individuals had been on strike and to their inevitable death. The death of the first hunger striker, Bobby Sands, was worldwide news and generated violent demonstrations throughout Ireland and worldwide condemnation. But with each subsequent death, publicity and outcry diminished. When the death of the tenth hunger strike generated very little media attention, the strike was allowed to be called off because the families of the hunger strikers said they would intervene medically to prevent further deaths. The hunger strikes were so successful partially because it fitted into the Christian ideal of laying down your life for your friends. The Iranian child martyrs and the Lebanese suicide bombers resonated in their communities because they fitted into the ancient Shi'a tradition of martyrdom. Allowing this honored ancient tradition of violent martyrdom to be more easily revived into a modern-day cult. For any prolonged campaign of suicidal terrorism to work, it is vital that it fits within a wider social context or else the sacrifice won't have be considered worthwhile.

The Ayatollah Khomeini established a cult of martyrdom for the child soldiers in the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war; the child martyrs were initially effective in stalling the advance of the Iraqi army. The cult of martyrdom not only encouraged the children to sacrifice their lives but help maintain within Iranian society of the value of that sacrifice. This cult of martyrdom was exported to the Shi'a Muslim and Iranian allied Hezbollah faction in Lebanon. Lebanese suicide bombers drove huge truck bombs into French, American, and Israeli military bases and the American Embassy. These suicide bombings were a devastatingly effective weapon tactically and more importantly, psychologically. Author Christoph Reuter describes the suicide bomber as a "psychological atom bomb." Both the French and American troops were quickly pulled out of Lebanon after nearly 300 soldiers were killed when two simultaneous truck bombs struck their bases. The Israelis retreated to Southern Lebanon and were subjected to further suicide campaigns until their withdrawal in 2000.

Although the suicide bombers originated in Shi'a Muslim community of Southern Lebanon, recent examination of the backgrounds of the bombers reveal that they were not as a whole motivated by religious faith. Many of the bombers were atheistic Marxists. The ideologically Marxist and non-Muslim Tamil Tigers until recently launched more suicide attacks than any other group. They have established their own cult of martyrdom so their community can place value on the sacrifice. The strategic and psychological value of suicide bombers quickly became apparent to many groups and under the right conditions it has emerged as a valid tactic. Suicide bombing became a valued weapon amongst the Palestinian Sunni terrorist groups despite the fact originating cult of martyrdom had been solely a Shi'a tradition from time of the schism between them. It was strategically, not religiously, motivated. Thus, I will demonstrate, suicide terrorists, by willingly sacrificing their lives for their cause, generate a new form of propaganda—propaganda of the dead.

Chapter five examines the origins of the global jihad and the emergence of al-Qaeda. When the attacks on September 11th announced to the world al-Qaeda's global jihad, few had heard of al-Qaeda or Osama bin Laden. Al-Qaeda proclaimed their global jihad in two fatwas in 1996 and 1998. The second fatwa was followed by joint suicide bombings of two US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In October 2000, another suicide bombing crippled the USS Cole in Yemen. The origins of the global jihad are tied into the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam or Islamism. Islamism was founded in the late 1920s and borrowed heavily from fascism and incorporated elements of socialism and nationalism. Islamists believe that Islam is not simply a religion but a political system. Islamist contend that modern Muslim states must be overthrown to establish Islamist societies based on *shari'ah*—Islamic law. Once these societies are in place they can reestablish the Caliphate. This is their sacred struggle or Jihad.

Jihadists were greatly influenced by the example of the Iranian revolution despite their beliefs that the Shi'a are heretics. But the founding event of the modern Jihadist movement was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The invasion by an

atheistic country of a Muslim country was seen as an anathema to many Islamists, and they campaigned for funding and volunteers to fight with the Afghans against the Soviets. These volunteers became known as the mujahedeen and were organized by the Pakistanis and funded by the Saudis, with help from the US. Unlike the majority of the mujahedeen, the Pakistanis and the Saudis didn't think they would defeat the Soviets but used the volunteers as a bulwark against a Soviet invasion of Pakistan. Likeminded Islamists, extremists, and the curious flocked to join the mujahedeen, buoyed by tales of miracles; many sought a glorious death rather than victory. A young and devout Osama bin Laden went to Peshawar join these "Afghan Arabs." His wealth and family connections instantly made him an important figure in the organization, but his piety and willingness to suffer with his men garnered their unyielding support. The withdrawal of the Soviets in 1988 left many of these fighters without a mission or a living. Some stayed and fought alongside the factions of Afghan warlords in the ensuing civil war in Afghanistan. Bin Laden set up al-Qaeda as a way to maintain the network of Afghan Arabs alive but with no clear agenda. Shortly thereafter, Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia. When Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, bin Laden offered his Afghan Arabs to the Saudi princes to defend the country. The Saudi royal family instead invited the American military into Saudi Arabia to help liberate Kuwait. The presence of hundreds of thousands of non-Muslim troops was very unpopular and deeply angered the already-slighted bin Laden. He was forced to leave Saudi because of his continued outspoken opposition to the foreign troops who now were permanently stationed in Saudi Arabia. He fled with many of his Afghan Arabs first to Sudan and later back to Afghanistan, where he pledged allegiance to the newly victorious Taliban. Bin Laden issued his first Fatwa against the Jews and Crusaders and established his first training camps. An old jihadist colleague the Egyptian Dr Alman Al-Zawahiri joined him, in 1998. They issued a stronger worded Fatwa and sent operatives on suicide mission to blow up two US embassies in Africa. This was al-Qaeda's first official act and they believed that this would provoke the 'paper tiger' that was America, into attacking them.

Al-Qaeda strategized that if they could provoke the US into invading Afghanistan they could defeat and humiliate them like the Soviets. Without US military aid they would be able to establish Islamic societies in Egypt and Saudi Arabia and restore the Caliphate. Their goal is not to destroy the US but to remove its influence in the region. President Clinton, embroiled in a sex scandal was unwilling to respond with a large military force to the al-Qaeda attack, instead sent cruise missiles to targets in Sudan and Afghanistan. Disappointed by the response, al-Qaeda started planning a devastating attack on American soil.

Following the September 11th attacks. The American led-invasion of Afghanistan was initially extremely effective. However due to political infighting between the CIA and the military, bin Laden was able to escape capture. Things looked very bad for al-Qaeda until the Bush administration decided that they would invade Iraq and remove Saddam. The invasion of Iraq was extremely unpopular globally. It was certainly a propaganda coup for al-Qaeda and it allowed them to rebuild their organization in Pakistan. Jihadists flocked to Iraq to join the insurgency against the Americans. Al-Qaeda was able to set up a franchise system for likeminded terrorist groups helping disseminate their technology, expertise, and name. The best know of these franchises was Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia set up by Al-Zarqawi. They were for a time extremely successful in the Iraqi insurgency and helped create a civil war between the Iraqi Sunnis and Shi'as.

Chapter six examines how twenty-first century terrorists carefully document their attacks and rely on these images of terrorism as new and deadly form of propaganda. This propaganda is quickly and easily disseminated via the Internet and is used both to recruit and radicalize would be Jihadis. In Iraq, recruits would arrive from other countries ready to be martyred. They were documented in a martyr video and sent out immediately on suicide missions often recorded by multiple cameras. Video has long been a recruitment tool for the Jihadis but the extend and availability of these videos is unprecedented. Videos of the imprisonment and beheading of hostages was also widely disseminated and were extreme examples of propaganda of the dead.

Finally, an effort is made to understand the attacks of September 11th using the writings of five leading contemporary philosophers and theorists to determine the future of terrorism and what role the media might be expected to play. The thread of terrorist actions over the years, intertwined with increasing media coverage is used to predict what our future may hold as terrorists become their own media generators.